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ABSTRACT
Inspired by the simple, yet effective, method of tweeting gibber-
ish to attract automated social agents (bots), we attempt to create
localised honeypots in the South African political context. We pro-
duce a series of defined techniques and combine them to generate
interactions from users on Twitter. The paper offers two key contri-
butions. Conceptually, an argument is made that honeypots should
not be confused for bot detection methods, but are rather methods
to capture low-quality users. Secondly, we successfully generate a
list of 288 local low quality users active in the political context.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Social network security and pri-
vacy; •Human-centered computing→ Collaborative and social
computing;
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1 INTRODUCTION
The prevalence of automated social agents on online social net-
works (OSNs) increasingly necessitate research on the phenome-
non. An automated agent, colloquially referred to as a bot on OSN
platforms such as Twitter, is a program which performs scripted ac-
tions such as following, tweeting, favouriting or retweeting. These
automated agents vary considerably in their uses and implementa-
tions. Such automated agents have high utility for organisations
and even individual users. Organisations increasingly find use for
automated agents in client relations management to improve their
capacity to deal with a large number of repetitive queries by clients.
Many examples of automated agents exist, which are aimed at per-
forming scripted utility functions for individuals. A simple example
is a social media assistant, which reacts to queries of users or to
unfold a thread on Twitter. Individuals can also augment their pro-
files by using automated scripts, which turns them into what is
usually labelled a cyborg. Cyborgs therefore exhibit many features
of automated agents, but are linked to a specific human user.
The use of automated social agents on OSNs is, therefore, not a
new phenomenon, but there is a recent increase in their applica-
tion for political purposes [5]. These automated agents come in
different guises. The majority of bots and use-cases are trivial to
implement and have a negligible effect on the average user. There
has, however, been a rise in the use of automated agents to effect
large scale influence according to political agendas, specifically
on social media. These political automated agents are used in a
number of ways. Howard et al. [5] explores some of the specifics
of political bot activities, especially as observed during the 2016
United States presidential election. This particular political event is
widely referenced as involving a notable increase in such activity.
The genesis, of this type, and level, of interference inWestern demo-
cratic politics might be the British referendum on their European
Union membership, colloquially known as Brexit. Howard and Kol-
lanyi [4] discovered that up to 32% of the conversation on Twitter,
involving the referendum, may have been driven by political bots.
Bastos and Mercea [1] investigated the role of these political bots
in sharing partisan and inaccurate news. In a review of the data
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of the referendum, Narayanan et al. [11] suggests evidence of in-
volvement from Russian borne actors in the creation of political
bots. The same patterns have been observed during the 2016 US
presidential election, especially an increase in the use of Facebook
as a platform for political interference [5].
South Africa has not been spared in this new practice of political
interference. There are observed cases of political bots on Twitter,
and an increase in partisan or false news websites. These revelations
have mostly been as the result of individual journalists investiga-
tions into suspicions activity involving a particular organisation’s
role in this practice [12]. South Africa is facing its first national
elections since this new phenomenon. As the economic centre of
Sub-Saharan Africa, there is enough political interest to attract
such political interference campaigns. There is, therefore, a need
to develop a means of systematically investigating political bots
within the South African political context.
Below, we offer a brief literature review to highlight prior advances
in this field and some key problems. Based on these problems, we
propose a systematic approach to developing a honeypot within a
specific context, which should be able to attract political bots which
are created for political engagement in South Africa.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
To develop effective social honeypots on Twitter, we build on prior
research. We only look at literature which deployed a set of honey-
pots on Twitter. We are interested in their honeypot design proce-
dures, specifically which activities are more successful than others
in attracting active automated agents and other low quality users
within a particular context.
2.1 Honeypots On Twitter
The term honeypot has its origins in network security research,
which defines it as a decoy computer resource used in networks
to deter system attackers from the real system [9]. The main aim
of designing a honeypot is to have the honeypot compromised,
probed or attacked. Through monitoring the honeypot, researchers
become more aware of activities that attackers perform when at-
tacking systems. This allows for better network design and security
measures.
The same method is applied to OSNs, where a user profile is created
with the purpose of attracting interaction from attackers on the
network. By recording the interactions with the honeypot, itself
also an automated agent, the researcher compiles a record of profiles
which are potentially automated agents. This was the approach
followed by Lee et al. [8]; they created automated agents which
tweeted gibberish, with the aim of attracting other automated agent-
s, while avoiding humans. More recently, Morstatter et al. [10]
defined social honeypots as automated accounts that are used to lure
other automated accounts by exhibiting non-human behaviours.
Lee et al. [8] deployed 60 social honeypots on Twitter for 7 months.
The social honeypots were divided into 4 types based on how they
tweet. The first tweeted normal text, the second used replies to
other social honeypots. The third type tweeted only URLs, while
the fourth tweeted containing trending Twitter topics. All of these
honeypots tweeted in gibberish, with the intention of only attract-
ing automated agents, which are not capable of distinguishing
between gibberish and non-gibberish content. They recorded 36000
interactions over the seven months.
There are multiple research efforts extending this initial attempt
at designing social honeypots on OSNs. The next section offers a
brief overview of the designs of prior research. We then critique
these design methods and provide a resolution before presenting
our own methodology for developing social honeypots within a
specific context.
2.2 Honeypot Designs
This section specifically reviews previous honeypot design efforts,
in order to identify successful designs to implement within this
new context.
Lee et al. [7] deployed honeypots on two OSNs, Myspace and Twit-
ter. Since we are interested in Twitter, we only report their honeypot
design on Twitter. They deployed a mixed design of honeypots con-
taining two features: whether they had profile information and
whether they had tweeted. They deployed the honeypots for a
month, during which they received interaction from 500 profiles.
The same dataset was used for Lee et al. [6], which offers no extra
explanation as to their social honeypot design.
Lee et al. [8] offered more specifics regarding their social honey-
pot methodology. They created 60 social honeypots, which were
deployed on Twitter for seven months. Each honeypot could post
four different types of tweets; a normal textual tweet which the
researchers do not define; an ‘@’ reply to other honeypots; a tweet
containing a URL link; or, a tweet containing one of Twitter’s cur-
rent top ten trending topics. By having four different types of tweets
it brings attention to the importance of tweet type when attracting
automated agents.
Yang et al. [15] offered amore detailed design. They created 96 social
honeypots, which they refer to as benchmarks. They also identified
three types of behaviours on Twitter as: tweeting, following, and
application platform. For each behaviour, distinct patterns were
identified.
Under tweet behaviour, the three patterns were: tweet frequency,
tweet keywords, and tweet topics. For tweet frequency the re-
searchers found that social honeypots that tweeted more frequently
attracted more automated agents. On tweet keywords the choices
were on using: popular trending topics; random hashtags; tweets on
current affairs; bait words; and tweets containing no hashtags. From
these actions, tweeting on trending topics and tweets with hashtags
attracted the most accounts, while current affairs attracted the least.
This highlights the sensitivity of interaction based on tweet content
type. Lastly, to understand the behaviour of following actions, five
social honeypots followed two verified accounts, of people in vari-
ous fields, a day. From these, those following users in entertainment
attracted the most automated agents.
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Elmendili et al. [3] deployed twenty social honeypots on Twitter,
which attracted interactions from 300 accounts, of which 90 were
confirmed to be automated agents. Unfortunately, they do not elab-
orate on the design of the honeypots.
Morstatter et al. [10] offeredmore information on the design of their
social honeypots. They developed nine honeypots which tweeted
Arabic phrases. Each honeypot randomly followed other honeypots,
randomly retweeted other honeypots, and retweeted the owners of
the Arabic phrases. The use of a language feature is a unique con-
tribution to the design of social honeypots. Their social honeypots
attracted interactions from 3602 accounts, which they assume to
be bots. This assumption is common, however, as Wang et al. [14]
highlighted; automated agents are able to comprehend statues on
Twitter. This weakens the assumption that bots would not be able to
discriminate between other bots, tweeting gibberish, and humans.
Moreover, Clark et al. [2] introduces another class of user: cyborgs.
Cyborgs are either humans who use algorithms to alter their pro-
files, or are automated agents that are run directly by a human. This
effectively weakens the assumption further, because the honeypot
might be attracting these cyborgs who are actually humans. This
supports the argument that there is a range of poor quality users
on social media platforms. Poor quality, in this instance, relates
to the lack of social authenticity of a user. For instance, a cyborg
that automatically follows other users back is not an honest social
reaction to being followed.
From the literature above, it is clear that, apart from Yang et al.
[15] there is a lack of systematic design elements to the honeypots
themselves. The activities of the honeypots are unclear or unin-
formative for external researchers. Lee et al. [7] gave incomplete
information about the profiles of their honeypots. Lee et al. [8] give
no explanation of how frequently their honeypots tweet. Elmendili
et al. [3] gives no explanation about the profiles of their honeypots
just that they had legitimate profiles which they do not describe.
Like Lee et al. [7] and Lee et al. [8] they also do not explain how
frequently their honeypots tweeted.
Based on the review of the literature it is unclear which methods
are more effective than others in either attracting interactions from
other profiles, or how effective the claim is of only attracting bots.
When the effectiveness of attracting only automated agents was ac-
tually measured, it turns out to be 30% of the attracted profiles. The
method is therefore not an effective bot classification methodology.
Although classification should not be the primary objective of social
honeypots, the narrative within the literature either assumes this,
like Morstatter et al. [10], or it is used only as a step in classification
methodologies.
We, therefore, have two objectives. Firstly, we argue that the ob-
jective of a social honeypot is not to classify automated agents,
but rather detect candidates for classification. Secondly, we offer
a detailed methodology of social honeypot behaviour on Twitter
by designing specific techniques. Paired with our overall objective
of discovering automated agents within a particular political and
geographical context, we then present our results.
The next section outlines our proposed distinction between classifi-
cation and detection objectives in automated agent research.
3 CLASSIFICATION VERSUS DETECTION
We propose a clarification of the distinction between classification
and detection objectives in automated agent research. The distinc-
tion is important because it determines the success criteria for the
methodologies.
Classification methodologies are concerned with the classification
of a user as belonging to a particular class. In most cases, these
classes are either automated agents or humans. Most bot detection
research methods are concerned with classification.
To develop classification methodologies researchers require an an-
notated dataset of users which provides the ground truth to train
models on the features of the classes. These trained models are then
capable of classifying unlabelled data into the classes by analysing
multiple features of each user. Whether the objective is to classify,
or to develop a classifier, the procedure requires data, it does not
necessarily discover data.
In contrast, detection methodologies should focus on the discovery
of data. There are various detection methods, of which social hon-
eypots is only one example. For instance, to gather user profiles
of legitimate users, instead of automated agents, Morstatter et al.
[10] manually selected ten legitimate users who tweeted particu-
lar Arabic phrases to generate a seed list of profiles. The friends
of these profiles were collected using snowball sampling. Social
honeypots are, therefore, more focussed on attracting users which
are of interest to be classified, and should therefore be labelled a
detection method, since it detects possible users of interest, and not
necessarily classifies them.
A helpful framework to introduce is the distinction between pre-
cision and recall, where classification is concerned with precision,
and detection with recall.
Precision is a measure of how accurately a method can discriminate
between classes, while minimising false positives. When a classifier
is used on OSNs, false positives are humans being detected as bots,
if the classification leads to a suspension of the user the OSN would
suffer disgruntled users. Thus they would avoid false positives. In
contrast, recall aims to reduce false negatives, i.e. if there is an
automated agent, the method should record it, regardless of falsely
recording humans in the process.
In classification it is common to qualify the performance of the
classifiers according to their precision, or a number of other related
performancemeasures based off a confusion table. It is, however, not
possible to accurately measure the recall ability of a social honeypot,
since the number of existing automated agents are always unknown.
The only way to accurately measure it is in controlled environments
where the number of target agents are known. Morstatter et al. [10]
also found that most social honeypot research favours precision
above recall.
A honeypot methodology should, therefore, prioritise recall, which
is to attract as many automated agents as possible. It is not the
intention of a honeypot to develop robust classifiers or filter out
unknown spammers. To improve recall, the methodology should
be able to distinguish between honeypot activities, which are more
SAICSIT ’18, September 26–28, 2018, Port Elizabeth, South Africa L.A. Cornelissen et al.
effective at generating interactions within certain contexts, and
should be able to detect a wide assortment of agents.
Previous literature has shown that from the attracted agents, only
about 30% can be classified as actual automated agents. The other
70% of attracted agents are not, however, false positives. They
should rather be regarded as poor quality agents for further in-
vestigation. Currently, classifiers are only interested in automated
agents that lead to a bias, which ignores other poor quality users.
There is some nuance introduced in different type of automated
agents, such as political bots or spamming bots [13]. Honeypots
should, therefore, be aimed at attracting poor quality agents of
which a subset may be automated agents.
4 METHODOLOGY
In order to attract active automated agents which are active in the
South African political sphere, we have developed a series of hon-
eypots based on combinations of identified techniques. The overall
objective is to identify a combination of simple techniques which
maximise the number of automated agent followers who engage
with the honeypots. In order to achieve this, we have employed the
following methodology.
Initially we used literature to identify a number of simple techniques
which may be expected to attract automated agents, these tech-
niques were then tested, individually and in combinations against
Twitter for a period of time before being evaluated for their effective-
ness. This section discusses the approach taken in the identification
of techniques and testing the effectiveness of each technique.
4.1 Solicitation Techniques
The techniques for attracting automated agents can be classified
into two very broad areas, those generating their own content, and
those relying on interactions with content generated by other users.
We define these techniques in this section with the τ symbol.
4.1.1 Content Interaction. Twitter permits three general interac-
tions with users and statuses (without generating new content).
These are friending a user, as well as favouriting or retweeting a
status. The techniques used to rely on other users are, therefore,
limited to these three broad categories. In order to solicit automated
agents based on content interactions, we must, therefore, identify
users to friend and statuses to favourite or retweet. Since this re-
search focuses on a South African political context, we focus on
users who are political actors in South Africa.
Political actors were identified in a two step process. First the web-
sites of the thirteen political parties were consulted to obtain a list
of party leaders. Some parties linked to Twitter profiles for leaders,
while we searched Twitter for others. The list of political leaders
was augmented by searching news articles for other relevant per-
sons and then evaluating their Twitter profiles to confirm relevance.
This process resulted in a total of 287 political actors, inclusive of
44 political leaders. Direct interaction with these political actors
results in the first three techniques for attracting automated agents.
τ1. Follow a series of political actors.
τ2. Favourite the most recent status of a series of political actors.
τ3. Retweet the most recent status of a series of political actors.
In addition to themost recent status of these users, we also identified
techniques which rely on content generated by these users. This
effectively identifies additional statuses and users to interact with.
A list of trending keywords and key phrases was generated from
the 44 political leaders, based on their activity in the previous
week.1 These keywords and key phrases were ranked based on
their popularity amongst the users. We then used these keywords to
identify six additional techniques based on interacting with the list
sequentially or in a random fashion. As with the keywords and key
phrases themselves, the content investigated by these techniques
was generated over the proceeding week. This allowed the content
to be relevant but not real-time.
τ4. Follow users that post statuses about a keyword topic in a
sequential way.
τ5. Follow users that post statuses about a keyword topic in a
random way.
τ6. Favourite a status about a keyword topic in a sequential way.
τ7. Favourite a status about a keyword topic in a random way.
τ8. Retweet a status about a keyword topic in a sequential way.
τ9. Retweet a status about a keyword topic in a random way.
Finally for techniques that consume content, Twitter permits users
to geotag their statuses with either a location or a place. Twitter
also permits real-time access to a subset of all statuses produced on
the platform or filtered based on a series of criteria. We used these
features to look at real-time statuses on the topics identified by the
keywords and key phrases above and were also geotagged as being
from or within South Africa. These statuses are then interacted
with in the same three ways as with the other techniques.
τ10. Follow users that post geo-local statuses about a real-time
keyword topic.
τ11. Favourite geo-local statuses about a real-time keyword topic.
τ12. Retweet geo-local statuses about a real-time keyword topic.
4.1.2 Content Generation. The second approach to attracting auto-
mated agents is to generate new content as statuses on the platform.
For the purposes of this research we do not define new as origi-
nal content, but rather content, which forms its own independent
status.
In order to post statuses that are likely to attract automated agents,
we have identified two areas to obtain relevant content from. The
first of these areas is content that has already been generated by
the list of 287 political actors previously identified. Whilst this
content is essentially duplicated from these users, it is posted as
new statuses rather than as interactions with existing statuses. For
1These keywords and key phrases were generated independently of the Twitter feature
of the same name. This is because, we only wished to identify trends amongst these
specific political actors; and secondly, because the use of Twitter trends by automated
agents is against the Twitter terms of service.
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the purposes of the research, the content of these 287 users from the
proceeding seven days was used. The second source of politically
relevant content is news. To this end we selected the headlines and
abstracts of news articles from the RSS feeds of both News24 and
Google News. Only South African news stories are used in both
cases. As news can progress somewhat rapidly, only the proceeding
day’s news is used at any given time.
As South Africa is linguistically diverse, with eleven official lan-
guages, we looked to produce content in languages other than
English. All the news content provided by both News24 and Google
is in English and the vast majority of observed statuses on Twitter
are also in English. We used Google Translate to convert all the
statuses and news articles into Afrikaans, Xhosa and Zulu.
Some research shows that automated agents do not look at sentence
structure or at full sentences when consuming content. It is assumed
that human agents will not friend a user who posts statuses that
are not coherent sentences. For this reason, we also randomise the
word order of all sources, across all languages.
Finally, in selecting content to produce, we take cognisance that
Twitter is an online social network and as a result, we include
mentions to one of the 287 political actors as well as hashtags to
our locally identified trending keywords.
Each of the categories in this section are permuted into a variety
of different techniques for content generation. Table 1 shows the
permutations we used to generate individual techniques. Not every
permutation (a total of 64 permutations exist) was considered. The
permutations that were considered were done so due to capacity
limitations (total number of Twitter users we had access to) and fo-
cused on English (as most content on Twitter, even in South Africa
is in English) with an approximately even split on the remaining pa-
rameters. This results in a total of 25 content generating techniques
which we then combined with the consumption techniques.
4.2 Honeypot Construction
Across the two types of techniques, we identified a total of 37 dif-
ferent techniques. Some early evaluation identified that users who
exclusively produce content, without ever following, retweeting or
favouriting other content, produce little social interaction on Twit-
ter. For this reason, this study only tested the content generating
techniques in combination with the content consumption tech-
niques. In addition to combinations of techniques, we also tested
the twelve content consumption techniques in isolation to deter-
mine the overall effectiveness of these techniques in isolation of the
content generation. Ideally, more combinations of these techniques
would be tested, but due to restrictions and limitations of Twitter,
we were only able to consider 41 different combinations. These
combinations are shown in Figure 1. Additionally, some techniques
were not tested at all due to the fact that Twitter identified some
honeypots as suspicious and suspended some of their user accounts.
Additionally, some combinations were tested more than once, at
random, to test the repeatability of our findings.
Each of the techniques were constructed as an interactive auto-
mated agent using Python and was tested for a period of one week.
Execution of the agents on Twitter was largely without incident,
except that a number of the original combinations were suspended
or terminated by Twitter for suspicious behaviour. We only re-
port on those techniques which survived all the way though our
experimentation.
4.3 Evaluation
In order to determine the overall effectiveness of the considered
techniques, we evaluated the followers that each honeypot attracted.
We will look at both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the
attracted accounts. We will record for each honeypot and technique
the number of interactions. Each interaction will then be analysed
in two ways to gain some qualitative insight. Firstly, we will classify
each attracted user as automated agent or human. This will enable
us to measure the precision of each technique and honeypot. By
separating the techniques we would also be able to get a crude
estimate of the recall ability of each technique. Secondly, we will
look at the profile characteristics of all the attracted bots.
5 RESULTS
This section offers the results of the honeypots. We first, review the
number of interactions we received per technique and honeypot.
We then offer a quantitative review of the users that were attracted
by the honeypots.
5.1 Interactions
This section reports on the number of interactions each technique
and honeypot attracted. We also include the classification of each
attracted user as human or automated in order to compare the
effectiveness of the honeypots at attracting automated agents.
To classify the users, we used a publicly available tool to classify
each profile which interacted with the honeypots. We checked all
the unique identifiers of the attracted profiles through Botometer
which gives a score for each identifier between 0 and 1, where 1
indicates that the user is an automated agent, and 0 a human.2
It is necessary to consider that Botometer itself may not return
a perfect result, but was used as a generally useful guide in this
study. Botometer returns a number of metrics for each user, but we
focused on the overall ‘universal’ score, which reflects how likely a
user is to be an automated agent. For the purposes of evaluating
our honeypots, we simply considered all users with a percentage
score of 50% or more to be an automated agent, while being aware
that not all of these will be.
Through our ensemble of honeypots, we attracted a total of 288
interactions from users on Twitter. These users were then run
through the Botometer API. The summary of attracted accounts are
shown in Table 2. We see that a total of 284 users could be classified
(4 were either deleted, changed to protected, or suspended). Of
these 284 accounts, 85 are classified as automated agents and 199
2We used the API interface. The public user interface is available at https://botometer.
iuni.iu.edu
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Table 1: Content Generating Techniques
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Figure 1: Technique Combinations for Honeypots
as humans. This means that 30% the attracted users are actually
automated agents, which is well within the scope of previously
reported accuracy rates [cf 3].
We observe in, Table 2, that, in terms of precision, the best perform-
ing technique is τ19 (N = 2, NBots = 2, NHumans = 0), which
exclusively attracted automated agents, albeit only two. This tech-
nique produces content in gibberish in Xhosa sourced from the
content produced by political actors on Twitter.
In terms of recall, we observe that τ10 (N = 298, NBots = 67,
NHumans = 231) had by the most interactions but this mostly con-
sists of accounts classified as humans. Recall that τ10 follows users
that post geo-local statuses about a real-time keyword topic. We
suspect, but can not show, that the high number of interactions are
due to the accounts blindly following back. The method with sec-
ond highest recall is τ25 (N = 2, NBots = 2, NHumans = 0), which
created content in coherent English created from news sources
outside of Twitter.
An overview of interactions we received with each technique is
presented in Figure 3, with the interactions for each honeypot (or
combination of techniques) illustrated in Figure 2. The y-axis is
ordered from most precise method to least. This means, that the
technique or honeypot at the top of the plot managed to attract more
automated agents than humans, whereas the technique or honeypot
at the bottom attracted more humans than automated agents. The
x-axis shows the number of interactions between accounts and
honeypots for the given technique. As each technique was used in
a number of honeypots, the x-axis is scaled by the overall number
of honeypots that made use of the given technique. The number of
honeypots used per technique can be deduced from Figure 1.
In Figure 2 we can see that similar patterns hold, but that with
τ10 the number of human interactions are reduced when it is used
in conjunction with other techniques. We also observe that τ1
is improved by combining it with other techniques. The highest
improvement is gained by combining it with τ13, which increased
both recall and accuracy. τ1 follows a series of political actors, while
τ13 is simply adding content production in English from political
sources. The same is true for other languages where combining τ1
with τ13 (Afrikaans) and τ37 (Zulu).
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Table 2: Botometer Summary Statistics of the Interacted Users per Technique
τ N Mean Median St. Dev. Min. 1st Quartile 3rd Quartile Max. N (Bots) N (Humans)
1 54 0.59 0.54 0.26 0.22 0.41 0.89 0.97 29 25
2 26 0.63 0.76 0.31 0.10 0.43 0.95 0.98 16 10
3 51 0.46 0.43 0.27 0.15 0.18 0.65 0.97 23 28
4 63 0.36 0.24 0.26 0.04 0.14 0.59 0.98 23 40
5 56 0.31 0.23 0.26 0.06 0.13 0.32 0.95 12 44
6 5 0.38 0.25 0.30 0.17 0.24 0.32 0.91 1 4
7 2 0.24 0.24 0.01 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.25 0 2
8 11 0.49 0.50 0.25 0.15 0.28 0.65 0.88 5 6
9 12 0.39 0.32 0.26 0.10 0.26 0.45 0.89 2 10
10 298 0.31 0.22 0.25 0.03 0.10 0.47 0.97 67 231
11 25 0.35 0.30 0.24 0.05 0.15 0.50 0.91 5 20
12 87 0.31 0.21 0.20 0.06 0.15 0.45 0.90 15 72
13 24 0.57 0.56 0.29 0.15 0.31 0.82 0.97 13 11
14 6 0.30 0.18 0.25 0.07 0.13 0.48 0.65 2 4
16 3 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.21 0.28 0 3
17 10 0.60 0.58 0.27 0.22 0.44 0.86 0.97 6 4
18 15 0.32 0.30 0.20 0.06 0.15 0.46 0.69 3 12
19 2 0.61 0.61 0.07 0.56 0.58 0.63 0.65 2 0
21 9 0.51 0.45 0.23 0.22 0.41 0.62 0.97 4 5
22 3 0.64 0.79 0.43 0.15 0.47 0.88 0.97 2 1
23 6 0.42 0.29 0.38 0.06 0.15 0.70 0.97 2 4
24 3 0.43 0.47 0.26 0.15 0.31 0.56 0.65 1 2
25 46 0.29 0.19 0.24 0.03 0.09 0.45 0.97 10 36
26 16 0.28 0.20 0.17 0.06 0.14 0.44 0.60 2 14
27 112 0.31 0.21 0.25 0.05 0.10 0.48 0.97 26 86
28 25 0.35 0.27 0.25 0.06 0.15 0.52 0.97 7 18
29 5 0.32 0.19 0.33 0.13 0.13 0.24 0.90 1 4
31 3 0.21 0.21 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.26 0.32 0 3
32 1 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0 1
33 10 0.48 0.52 0.28 0.15 0.20 0.65 0.97 5 5
34 42 0.30 0.21 0.24 0.05 0.10 0.48 0.97 10 32
35 11 0.50 0.58 0.29 0.15 0.22 0.70 0.97 6 5
37 10 0.60 0.58 0.27 0.22 0.44 0.86 0.97 6 4
Total 284 85 199
5.2 Descriptives of Recorded Users
In order to get an idea of the users that were attracted by our
honeypots we review quantitative descriptions of the attracted
accounts. Individual descriptions are impractical, so we will provide
general descriptives of all attracted accounts.
Table 3 summarises the accounts that interacted with the honeypots.
As mentioned, the honeypots attracted a total of 288 accounts. Of
these accounts, the average count of statuses, or tweets, is 11, 356,
the average number of friends (those an account follows) is 17, 312
and the count of followers (those that follow and account) is 27, 927.
What is interesting is that the attracted profiles have on average
more followers than friends. However, when considering medians,
this is reversed (see Figure 4). This is because of a skewed distribu-
tion commonly found in social networks. It is also observed that
the average age for the attracted accounts is 1, 154 days, with the
youngest being 29 days, and the oldest 3, 486. Figure 5 indicates
that the average age tends to be low. We should also note that we
have attracted a total of 10 verified accounts. Verified accounts are
accounts that are verified by Twitter as belonging to a public figure
or corporation.
6 CONCLUSION
The two objectives of this study were to firstly clarify the objec-
tives of social honeypots on OSNs by reiterating the idea that the
measure of performance should be recall rather than precision. Un-
fortunately, there is no way to measure recall in the ‘wild’ since
the total number of targets is not known. Nevertheless, the ob-
jective is then to maximise the number of accounts attracted by
a honeypot. To do this, we isolated the design of honeypots into
distinct techniques. Each technique can be tested in isolation and
in concert to test for improvements in both recall and precision. We
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of Interacted Users
Statistic N Mean Median St. Dev. Min. 1st Quartile 3rd Quartile Max.
Statuses 288 11 356 1 666 28 433 0 319 7 813 210 360
Friends 288 17 312 1496 107 871 0 572 3 729 1 606 758
Followers 288 27 927 691 155 738 4 228 2 400 1 628 140
Listed 288 90 1 445 0 0 5 4 892
Account Age 288 1 154 815 1 067 29 160 2 108 3 486
Notes: Rounded to nearest whole number.
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Figure 2: Agent Interactions per Honeypot
therefore get a sense of recall by comparing the amount of accounts
each technique attracted. For instance, we showed that the recall
of τ1 is improved when employed with particular other techniques.
Moreover, we can confirm that some techniques far outperform
7
16
31
32
26
9
12
6
11
18
29
5
25
10
27
34
28
14
23
24
4
21
3
8
33
1
13
35
17
37
2
22
19
−40 −20 0
Total Interactions / Honeypot Count
Te
ch
ni
qu
e
Agent Type Human Automated
Figure 3: Agent Interactions per Technique
others in attracting interactions, particularly when following other
profiles.
This is a distinct improvement over previous studies, where they
did not report the honeypot behaviour in isolation, so there is no
way to know whether the attraction rate is simply due to ‘follow
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back’ profiles. Working from these results, it is now possible to
systematically build a more contextually effective honeypot, rather
than simply designing them with a collection of hypothesised tech-
niques, never knowing which are actually drawing interactions.
We also showed that honeypots which are specifically designed to
only attract accounts related to South Africa—by tweeting in local
languages—managed to attract interactions. Interestingly, we also
managed to attract accounts that are set to Ukrainian and Chinese
locales.
For future research, we would design a more systematic phased
approach in order to isolate the effectiveness of each technique
over time. We would also like to manually inspect the attracted
accounts, since we suspect that the standard Botometer measures
are conservative and contextually naÃŕve.
This dataset also offers a training dataset for future bot-classification
work within the South African context,with the added benefit of
describing the context around the attraction of agents, which would
help improve the utility of the dataset in machine learning applica-
tions.
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